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Introduction
The systemic nature of technological change is now a well established result of much literature,
of both theoretical (e.g. Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Lundvall, 1992; De Liso & Metcalfe,
1996; Edquist, 1997) and empirical (e.g. Nelson, 1993; Patel & Pavitt, 1994; Saxenian, 1994;
Carlsson, 1995) nature. As the innovative process does not follow a ‘linear’, isolated path, but
occurs within specific institutional contexts of interactive relationships between different
organisations, concepts such as those of innovative and technological systems appear to be the
most appropriate units of analysis. However, several specifications have been provided, by
referring to both functional and geographical boundaries, which are differently characterised and
thus determine differences in the level of analysis and in methodologies.
As far as this paper is concerned, we will adopt a broad and structured notion of technological
system that we deem particularly suitable to retain relationships that are not only innovative as
such, but also techno-economic — i.e. related not only to the functioning of the innovative and of
the production sub–systems, but also of the market (both domestic and foreign) and the institutional
infrastructure. footnote  Furthermore, our definition refers to national technological systems,
because we claim that, even in a world of increasing globalisation and localisms, national
boundaries still matter: for example, interesting idiosyncrasies and clusters emerge by looking at
the ‘configurations’ that technological systems assume in different countries (Leoncini &
Montresor, 1998).
This paper aims at measuring and comparing some of the key relationships within a
technological system by considering its intersectoral techno–economic linkages. footnote  We thus
intend to highlight the role of innovative flows of different magnitude within it, the location of its
‘cores’ and ‘terminals’, the inward or outward configuration of its partitions, from both a
‘cross–sectional’ and a ‘time series’ comparative perspective.
The application refers to eight OECD countries along three temporal spans (see Appendix A1
for full details). It consists of a network analysis of the intersectoral innovation flows matrices we
have obtained by disaggregating each technological system into 15 manufacturing sectors
(Appendix A2).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the methodological issues about innovation
flows matrices and network analysis are briefly reviewed. Section 3 describes the empirical results.
Section 4 contains the main conclusions.
Input-output approach and network analysis
The approach that we have adopted in this paper mainly follows up a methodology which tries
to combine two complementary methods, that is, input-output analysis and network analysis. The
basic rationale which underlines the use of input-output analysis in the study of technological
systems is briefly restated in Section 2.1. The ‘technological’ meaning of the most typical network
analysis indicators is then discussed in Section 2.2.
The input-output matrix of innovation flows
An input-output approach to the concept of technological system can be developed by
combining the input-output table of intermediate (or capital, if available) goods with a conformable
matrix of sectoral innovative efforts (R&D), thus obtaining a particular ‘input-output’ matrix of
innovation flows, R￿n ￿ n￿. footnote 
Since it measures innovative flows that are ‘embodied’ in the productive flows exchanged
among sectors, R can actually account for techno-economic kinds of relationships, which are
shaped both by the innovative sub-system (proxied with the R&D expenditure) and by theproductive sub-system (proxied with the input-output tables). Furthermore, if, as in the present
case, R is obtained by resorting to the notion of vertically integrated sectors, using the Leontief
multipliers, the market sub-system is implicitly retained through the final demand vector, while
both direct and indirect relationships between sectors can be caught. footnote 
As we are particularly interested in comparing technological systems with respect to structural
and relational elements, in what follows the matrix R is transformed into a matrix C￿n ￿ n￿, by
considering a matrix of normalised intersectoral innovative acquisitions. In so doing, the matrix
obtained is ‘relativised’, and the scale differences between the sub-systems are neutralised, as well
as the intrasectoral flows, which can thus be neglected.
Network analysis
Although mainly developed in economic sociology (Scott, 1991), network analysis indicators
and techniques can be applied to examine the structure and the characteristics of a technological
system. In the present case, it can be directly performed on the basis of the matrices of innovative
flows, C￿n ￿ n￿, treating the n sectors as ‘nodes’ and their innovation flows as ‘edges’.
In particular, the density and the centralisation of the networks may provide information about
the degree of connectivity (Section 2.2.1.), while the centrality degree of the nodes and the oriented
graphs (Section 2.2.2.) allow us to map innovative flows of a certain magnitude.
Density
The density of a network composed by n nodes is generally defined as the ratio between the
actual number of edges, s, and the maximum number of directed edges:
D = s
n￿n ? 1￿
, 0 < D < 1.   #   
It is straightforward that greater values of ( ref: eq1 ) indicate denser networks. The density of
the network corresponding to a technological system can thus be assumed to measure its internal
cohesion. That is, the higher is the density of the network, the more connected is the technological
system, and vice versa.
In a valued network, such as that of the technological system of the C matrix, the ‘actual’
number of edges (in this case the number of innovative flows) is usually the number of edges
smaller than a certain threshold value k, that is sk (Scott, 1991; Faust & Wasserman, 1995). This
amounts to considering dichotomised matrices, Cdic, which are binary transformations of the
original matrices C, made up of 1s and 0s according to a ‘greater than’ test performed with respect
to the ‘cut-off’ value k:
Cij
dic = 1 if Cij>k; Cij
dic = 0 if Cij†k.   #   
As the choice of an exogenous, usually arbitrary, threshold value for k is one of the main
limitations of this indicator, for each technological system we have built up a series of dichotomised
matrices by using, rather than a scalar, k, a set of cut-off vectors, k1,k2, ...,kz , each one made
up of the ordered distribution of the values of C for country z (in our dataset z = 8). In so doing the
choice of the cut-off values is carried out endogenously, on the basis of the characteristics of the
investigated sample.
In order to compare the density distributions across different countries, it is helpful to jointly
consider their diagrammatic representations: in so doing, it is necessary to select one country zD
and to work out the density distributions of all the systems of the sample with respect to kzD. It is
immediate that, by measuring relative ‘distances’, the choice of country zD is not crucial for the
final result, but rather for the clarity of the diagrammatic representation.
Centrality, centralisation and oriented graphs
While density is a characteristic of the whole network, centrality is instead proper of each one
of its nodes. It measures how central a node is through the number of its connections to and from
the other nodes of a network (Freeman, 1979). footnote  Formally, the inward (in) and the outward
(out) degree centralities of a certain node j are in general defined as follows:
Gin
j = >iin;Gout
j = >iout   #   where iin and iout indicate one of the edges which comes, respectively, in and out of node j. It is
hence immediate that 0 < G￿6￿
j < n ? 1 and that the greater is G￿6￿
j , the more central is the node j,
either with respect to the incoming edges (Gin
j ), or to the outcoming ones (Gout
j ), or with respect to
both. footnote 
Also the centrality indicator assumes a particular meaning when the network considered is that
of the technological system (matrix C). Since the inward and the outward edges stand now for
intersectoral innovative acquisitions and diffusions, respectively, the two measures of centrality
help in determining whether a sector is pervasive or dependent.
Obviously, in order to perform this analytical examination of the sectoral nodes it is necessary
to extract one or more selected cut-off values ks from the kz vectors described above. Thus,
( ref: eq3 ) is evaluated for the innovative acquisitions and diffusions which ‘survive’ the
dichotomisation with respect to k. Although the analysis of the density distribution may be of help,
the choice of the cut–off value is not free of a certain degree of arbitrariness.
Although it is to be referred to a single sector, the degree centrality can also be used to analyse
the nature of the whole technological system, at least in two ways.
First of all, centrality indices can be combined to work out the inward and the outward degree










￿n ? 1￿￿n ? 2￿
  #   
where GjD is the centrality value of the most central node, jD, either outward or inward.
According to ( ref: eq4 ), the centralisation indices measure the ‘centrality-gap’ between each
node and the most central one, relative to the maximum level of centrality of a network composed
by n nodes (i.e. ￿n ? 1￿￿n ? 2￿). In general, thus, a high index of centralisation identifies a network
with wide gaps between the (centrality) positions of the nodes, while a low value identifies a
network with similar (centrality) positions. In the present case, this corresponds to technological
systems whose sectoral partitions can be deemed, respectively, ‘hierarchic’(i.e. high degree
centralisation) and ‘parithetic’ (i.e. low degree centralisation). The former case is less conducive to
interactive innovative relationships than the latter.
A second systemwide application of the centrality indices can be obtained by examining their
sectoral distributions. In this way it is, for example, possible to identify the composition of a
technological system in terms of innovative ‘cores’ and ‘terminals’. Intuitively, we define ‘cores’
those sectors, or clusters of sectors, that ‘count’ relatively more in terms of the number of sectors
to which they transfer innovation flows (dominance of outward relationships). The contrary holds
for the ‘terminals’, that is the sectors from which innovations are acquired (dominance of inward
relationships).
The numerical balance between ‘cores’ and ‘terminals’ is an important element in comparing
the structure of different technological systems and in relating it to their ‘connectivity degree’, in
turn proxied by their density and centralisation. On the other hand, it is as much important to
analyse how the former map into the latter, determining which sectors are innovated by which. This
would actually further specify the analysis from a qualitative point of view.
In this last respect, it is convenient to integrate the centrality analysis with that of the directed
graphs which correspond to each of the selected dichotomized matrices Cdic￿k￿: there is indeed a
‘bijection’ between the set of matrices and the set of directed graphs.
Although the concept of oriented graph and its varieties are defined through rigorous
mathematical definitions, footnote  in what follows we are only interested in distinguishing different
kinds of graphs in qualitative terms. In this respect, it should be noted that as the present analysis is
based on vertically integrated sectors, direct and indirect relationships are revealed jointly by a
unique innovative flow. For this reason, the directed graph that is associated to a certain
dichotomized matrix has to be interpreted as an ensemble of ‘innovative couples’ (univocal and
biunivocal) and (possibly) ‘development blocks’ (DeBresson, 1996, pp. 167-168). On the contrary,standard or non standard ‘trees’ and ‘cycles’, or more simple ‘technological complexes’ do not
apply to the same networks, which can be read at most as particular ‘cliques’ (DeBresson, 1996,
pp. 169-171). Although this consideration introduces a fortiori a certain structural homogeneity,
relevant differences can however be highlighted across different technological systems in
comparing the sectoral composition of the ‘innovative couples’ and the sectoral location of the
eventual ‘development blocks’.
The empirical investigation
The empirical investigation performed in this paper refers to eight OECD countries (i.e.
Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom)
along three temporal spans (early 80s, middle 80s, and early 90s). footnote 
The analysis of the density distributions (Section 3.1) is performed with respect to the vector of
cut-offs of Canada (i.e. kCanada), so that this distribution is the only one to be perfectly linear, while
those of the remaining countries are distributed along it. The choice of Canada has been suggested
because it allows us to visualize better than the other the evolution of the density ranking in moving
from large to small innovative flows.
For obvious scope constraints, given the relatively large number of countries investigated, and
along more than one period, the centrality-centralisation analysis and the exam of the directed
graphs (Section 3.2) are carried out with respect to a unique threshold value. In particular, facing a
trade-off between ‘indistinguishable’ (with too many links) and ‘trivial’ (with too few links)
networks, we have chosen a relatively small cut-off value (k = 0.005), which amounts to retaining
innovative flows of large magnitude.
Density
As far as the density analysis is concerned, the main results that emerge from the inspection of
Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 can be summarised as follows:
(i) In the first period (Figure 3.1), Japan, Germany and France cluster as the most dense
technological systems along the whole cut-offs distribution, hinting the opportunity of greater
synergetic benefits. The Japanese system, in turn, reveals greater density values than the other
ones, confirming the idiosyncratic nature of the former and the structural similarity of the latter.
The model of capitalism seems to be relevant also for an ‘intermediate’ density cluster made up of
two Anglo-Saxon systems (United Kingdom and Canada), with a lower degree of connectivity.
Finally, Denmark and The Netherlands (the smallest countries of our sample) have the least dense
distributions, suggesting how problems of innovative ‘critical mass’ might hinder extended
interactions.
(ii) The picture for the mid 80s (Figure 3.2) resembles that of the previous one, as far as the
most dense distributions are concerned, although the gap between the Japanese and the Rhenish
systems narrows. The club of the most connected countries narrows while entering the so-called
‘globalisation’ phase, in which the systems come to interact more intensively and extensively in the
international scenario, with clear consequences for the sustainability of their internal innovative
networks. With the exception of The Netherlands, which still lag behind in terms of density, also
the less connected technological systems get more aligned. Only with respect to a limited range of
intermediate cut-off values, Australia, another small country, lays quite apart from the group of the
other, which appears now more homogeneous following the substantial gain of Denmark.
(iii) In the early 90s (Figure 3.3), with the exception of the most and the least dense
distributions, the alignments between the investigated technological systems becomes even more
apparent, hinting how globalisation tends to reduce the diversities among the countries. Relevant
changes occur also at the extremes. On the one hand, Japan loses its domain at the advantage of
Germany, although only for intermediate cut-off values, while France keeps staying apart. On the
other hand, the range of cut-off values for which Australia lags behind is more narrow than in the
second period.
In general terms, the analysis of the density shows two main facts. First of all, the clustering of
the investigated technological systems are highly affected by structural elements, such as, for
example, the relevant model of capitalism and the country-size. Secondly, the eight countriesinvestigated show a rather evident process of ‘convergence’ footnote  in the values of the density
along the time, especially in the firsst two periods. While in the third period the set of high density
countries shows divergent patterns for some cut–off values. To be sure, the convergence does not
appear to be absolute. Although the three most ‘dense’ countries are more similar in their structure
in 1990 then they are in 1980, and the same holds (to a lesser extent) for the ‘Anglo-Saxon’
countries footnote , a clear lag persists between the two groups. Therefore, it seems likely to
interpret this evidence as a process of ‘conditional’ convergence, i.e. a process of inter-club rather
than one of intra-club convergence.
Centrality and centralisation of degree
Although limited to relatively large innovative flows (as already said, the cut–off value is
0.005), the sectoral analysis of centrality (Tables 3.1 to 3.3) confirms some ‘stylized facts’ and
some intuitions one can draw on the particular focus of this study.
Although at different degrees in different technological systems and periods, footnote  the most
traditional sectors — i.e. food, beverages and tobacco (Sector 1), textiles and leather (Sectors 2),
wood and furniture (Sector 3) and paper and printing (Sector 4) — are all dependent, as the
‘indegrees’ are higher than the correspondent ‘outdegrees’. In particular, with the only exception of
Japan (and of the German paper sector in the first two periods), the same sectors are ‘totally’
dependent’, as the ‘outdegrees’ are nil: the ‘supplier dominated’ nature of these branches appears
therefore confirmed (Pavitt, 1984). Another general result concerns the most pervasive sectors of
each technological system. With some few exceptions — notably that of Japan footnote  — these
are actually a ‘specialized supplier’ sector — metal products (Sector 10) — and a ‘science-based’
sector — chemical products (Sector 5) — whose technology has a dominant ‘material’ nature and
which are therefore prominent when ‘embodied’ innovative flows are considered. This
interpretation obviously better fits the former sector that, unlike the latter, is actually ‘totally’
pervasive, i.e. with a nil ‘indegree’ (still apart from Japan and from Germany in the last period).
The same kind of argument also holds for those sectors — such as shipbuilding and repairing
(Sector 12) and motorveichles (Sector 13) — whose large scale (Pavitt, 1984) naturally calls for
consistent intermediate and capital material inputs: with some relevant exceptions — notably that
of the German motorveichles — these sectors are actually ‘dependent’, and in a total degree (apart
from the French motorveichles and the Japanese shipbuilding sectors). A general total dependent
nature is also revealed by the professional goods sector (Sector 14), although its innovative
acquisitions are also substantially ‘disembodied’.
The nature of the remaining sectors is much more time and system specific, as it emerges when
the sectoral distributions of the centrality indices are considered along with the centralisation index.
At the outset, this kind of analysis shows how in all periods two clusters of technological
systems can be identified (Tables 3.1–3.3). The former, with a core constituted of two main
pervasive sectors (Sector 10 and Sector 5), at most encompassing few other slightly pervasive
branches, and with a quite ‘hierarchic’ structure (high outdegree centralisation), is made up of
Australia, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Another one, whose core
of pervasive sectors extends more substantially also to other sectors (in addition to Sector 5 and
10), and whose structure is relatively more ‘parithetic’ (low outdegree centralisation) comprehends
France, Germany, and Japan. This partition resembles pretty well other taxonomies that, mainly
focussing on purely innovative and atomistic questions, ‘split’ the same group of countries with
respect to their size, their R&D intensities, patents scores, educational levels, and so on (see, for
example, Nelson, 1993). However, as the present one is traced according to techno-economic and
relational aspects, it is not fully consistent with them: once technological systems are considered,
the ‘myopic’ way in which the United Kingdom organise the innovative process (Patel & Pavitt,
1994) actually becomes more decisive and makes it more similar to the less structured, ‘small’
systems of innovation (Leoncini & Montresor, 1998).
However, the two clusters are not homogeneous and completely stable in time, so that a more
detailed examination is necessary.(i) In the first period (Table 3.1), the ‘simple-core’ group of technological systems is clearly
exemplified by the case of Denmark, with only two pervasive sectors (Sector 5 and 10), whose
outward centrality is quite different (in favor of Sector 10) and whose interconnections are not
mutual. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom appear instead slightly more ‘connected’, as
they extends the same simple core, still unbalanced towards Sector 10, to the machinery sector
(Sector 11), and this could hint to the importance of their specialisation in the non-electrical
partition of the same sector. Resource–related questions might instead have a role in explaining the
Canadian extension to the coal and petroleum sector (Sector 6). On the other hand, in both cases
the extension (in terms of outdegree centrality) is not very big, so that the correspondent outdegree
centralisations are nearly the same.
As far as the second cluster is concerned, France and Germany appear to be once again quite
similar, as shown by the outdegree centralisation indices. The metal-chemical innovative core is
now more balanced towards maximum outward centrality values, and also wider. The machinery
sector (Sector 11) is almost as much pervasive as Sector 10 and 5, as well as the ‘resource
intensive’ sectors (Sectors 6-9) are not totally dependent, or even slightly pervasive (e.g. the rubber
and plastic products (Sector 7)). Centralisation indexes are substantially lower than those in the
previous cluster. A further peculiar feature is identified by the motorveichles sector (Sector 13),
nearly pervasive in France and highly pervasive in Germany. At this regard specialisation still
matters.
Another confirmation comes from the highly idiosyncratic nature of Japan. Although metal
products (Sector 10) are not as much pervasive as in France and Germany, the pervasive core is
the widest, as it spans from sector 5 to sector 11, at nearly maximum values. Furthermore, the
sectors of the ‘terminal’ — that is the traditional ones (Sectors 1-4) — are less dependent, with the
consequence that the (outdegree) centralisation index is lower than in the previous systems.
(ii) Coming to the second period (Table 3.2), Australia, notably another small and quite isolated
systems of innovation (Gregory, 1993), joins the cluster of the most ‘polarised’ technological
systems. The dual pervasive core of Denmark gets more balanced (between Sector 5 and 10) and
extends, although at a lesser extent, to machineries (Sector 11). This seems to hint to the fact that
the ‘systemic evolution’ of the Danish (but also of the Swedish) system benefited from an active
specialised supplier core, although with a consistent foreign penetration (Edquist & Lundvall,
1993). In this respect, Denmark ‘overcomes’ Canada, whose core just substitutes ‘energy’ (Sector
6) for ‘machineries’ (Sector 11), and The Netherlands, ‘catching-up’ with the United Kingdom,
where the pervasiveness of machineries (Sector 10) and chemicals (Sector 5) also increase.
In spite of these recombinations, the centralisation level of the former group is however still
detached from that of the second group, in turn quite stable. The only relevant variation is actually
the centralisation increase for France, in turn due to the out-centrality increase in machineries
(Sector 11) and non-finished metals (Sector 9). In spite of this change, and of the slight decrease
for Japan and increase for Germany, respectively, in the centrality indeces within the ‘resource
intensive’ partition (Sectors 6-9), the Rhenish-Japanese dichotomy still persists.
(iii) In the third period (Table 3.3), Australia keeps its position of the highest centralised
technological system, revealing a configuration that appears structurally polarised around no more
than two pervasive sectors, while the remaining are totally dependent. Within the same
‘simple–core’ cluster, the Danish technological system further increases the pervasivity level of
chemicals (Sector 5) and machineries (Sector 5), switching from the most to the least centralised
position. Once again, this seems to be a case of conditional catching-up, induced by a structural
change towards more synergetic interrelationships. A similar pattern can be identified for the
United Kingdom, whose two-sector pervasive core becomes more balanced too. A ‘dynamic’
sub-cluster, made up of Denmark and United Kingdom, seems therefore identifiable within the
former cluster, as opposed to a ‘structurally myopic’ one, made up of Australia and Canada.
The most remarkable changes of the period are however in the second cluster. Although the
centralisation is unchanged, Germany radically changes the distribution of its pervasive core, which
narrows to chemicals (Sector 5), metal products (Sector 10), machineries (Sector 11) andmotorveichles (Sector 13), but now with maximum (or nearly maximum) outward degree
centrality. The remaining sectors becomes totally dependent, and this seems to point out to an
intensive, rather than an extensive structural change, focusing on and exploiting the externalities of
the main sectoral specialisations. A different argument holds for France, whose core composition
remains basically the same, but where the inward and the outward centrality degrees change,
making the system less centralised and more ‘interconnected’. The change of Japan, although less
relevant and ininfluent on its idiosyncrasy, is instead in the opposite direction. In spite of the
increase of outward centrality in Sector 14 and 15, the combined effect of a lower pervasiveness in
metals (Sector 10) and energy products (Sector 6), and of a higher pervasiveness in machineries
(Sector 11) and rubber and plastic (Sector 7) determines a slight loss of connectivity (higher
outdegree centrality).
Oriented graphs
At the outset, let us observe how the oriented graphs of the C0,005
dic matrices (Figure 3.4–3.6)
make the two clusters discussed above immediately apparent. On the one hand, we have Australia,
Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, with a set of relatively few
‘innovative couples’, exclusively (or nearly exclusively) univocal, and mainly (or solely) based on
Sector 5 (chemicals) and 10 (metal products). On the other hand, we have France, Germany and
Japan, where the innovative couples are more dense, more frequently biunivocal (but not very
much), and also based on sectors other than Sector 5 and 10. As suggested by the centrality
analysis, the relationship between pervasive and dependent sectors is quite dichotomic so that
within the latter, more systemic, cluster it is not possible to identify ‘development blocks’ or
similarly articulated structures (DeBresson, 1996).
In general terms the two groups show quite distinct sectoral specifications.
In all the technological systems of the former group the metal products sector (Sector 10)
extends its innovative diffusions over all the remaining ones. Conversely, the chemical sector
(Sector 5) innovates only some of them, namely traditional (e.g. Sectors 2, 3 and 4) and resource
intensive (e.g. Sectors 6, 7, 8 and 9) sectors, which are technologically closer to it. The diffusions
towards the sectors whose technology is more immaterial are instead in general relatively less
frequent and specific to certain countries and periods. The machinery sector (Sector 11), when it
comes to integrate the previous core, follows a quite different pattern, as its diffusions generally
reach only the scale intensive sectors of the classification (i.e. Sector 12 and 13) and the residual
branches (Sector 15). The traditional and/or resource intensive sectors are instead affected in some
cases only. The sectoral partitions which refer to Sectors 5 and 11 are quite separated (i.e. the
relative sectors overlap only slightly) and the same ‘pivotal’ sectors do not communicate, although
they are both innovated by Sector 10. Therefore, a material and an immaterial technology areas
seem to emerge. Extra-core diffusions are very limited, or even absent.
Within the second group of countries, the chemical sector (Sector 5) becomes as pervasive as
the metal products one (Sector 10), which in turn has a maximum outward centrality. The
exception is Japan, for which Sector 5, and not 10, becomes the most pervasive. The same pattern
holds for machineries (Sector 11), which always innovate at least 70% of the remaining ones.
Although the three sectoral partitions now overlap more, a fortiori, the pivotal sectors still do not
generally communicate. The resource intensive sectors (Sectors 6-9) increase their importance.
Sometimes they join Sector 5 (and eventually 10 and/or 11) in a sort of super-core, while in some
other cases they constitute a sort of peripheral core. Extra-core diffusion is less exceptional, if not
even normal (as in the case of Japan).
A more precise specification of these regularities, and of their temporal evolution, obviously
calls for a period-by-period analysis.
(i) In the early 80s (Figure 3.4), and within the first cluster, The Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, unlike Canada and Denmark, show a core which marginally extends also to the
machinery sector (Sector 11), as it pervades only the most adjacent branches, those of transport
equipments (Sectors 12 and 13). footnote  The diffusions of the chemical sector (Sector 5) towards
the resource intensive partition encompasses energy products (Sector 6) only in the mostenergy-endowed systems (Canada and The Netherlands). Moreover, in Canada the latter also
innovates the former identifying a characteristic biunivocal innovative couple.
Within the second cluster, Japan clearly stands out as the system with the largest core. This is
in turn made up of a mostly pervasive ‘super-core’, centered on basic materials and on their
chemical transformation (Sectors 5, 6 and 8), and a ‘pheriperic core’, made up of synthetic and
(non finished) metallic products (Sectors 7 and 9), and of (finished) metal products (Sector 10) and
machineries (Sector 11). However, the former (Sectors 7 and 9) are neither linked between them
nor with other singular nodes, while the latter (Sectors 10 and 11) exceptionally do not innovate the
chemicals (Sector 5) and some other traditional and resource intensive sectors. In France and in
Germany the supercore is limited to Sectors 5, 10 and 11, still not totally interlinked, while the
resource intensive sectors are much less pervasive than in Japan. Energy products (Sector 6) and
rubber and plastics (Sector 7), especially in France, are the only ones remarkably pervasive,
concentrating their diffusions towards both traditional and other resource intensive sectors.
Exceptionally, some of the Japanese traditional sectors (e.g. Sector 2 and 3, Sectors 3 and 4)
constitute biunivocal innovative couples and also reach the residual sector (Sector 15). Another
relevant extra-core diffusion is that of German motorveichles (Sector 13), affecting, in addition to
Sector 4 and 8, as in France, also traditional sectors, such as Sector 1, 2 and 3.
(ii) Coming to the second period (Figure 3.5), the three–nodes pervasive core (Sectors 5, 10
and 11) becomes dominant in the first group of countries, as Australia is the only one exclusively
based on Sector 5 and 10. The chemical diffusions become wider, as they now systematically reach
also the energy sector (Sector 6) and all the traditional ones, except for food and beverages (Sector
1). footnote  A similar trend can be observed for machineries (Sector 11), in particular in the
British and in the Danish systems, where it singularly innovate also some ‘upper’ sectors (i.e.
Sector 2, 4, 6 and 8), showing how the traditional and the resource intensive sectors here benefit
from virtuous backward linkages. In The Netherlands the same linkages are instead limited to the
‘lower’ sectors (i.e. Sectors 12, 13, 14 and 15).
The structure of the technological systems within the second group of countries is identical to
the previous period, but its specification is slightly changed. The Japanese energy products sector
(Sector 6) switches from the supercore to the periphery, loosing its diffusions to Sectors 11, 13 and
14. The reverse holds for ferrous and non ferrous metals (Sector 9), as does not affect the chemical,
and some traditional and resource intensive sector. The machineries sector (Sector 11) is mostly
pervasive in France and in Germany. Out of the resource intensive sectors, the pervasivity of
rubber and plastic (Sector 7) decreases in Japan, getting disconnected from Sectors 5, 8, 9, 10 and
11, while it increases in France and in Germany. The same holds for the French energy products
(Sector 6), while the German one only innovates Sector 1. A similar dicothomy holds for the
ferrous and non-ferrous metal products (Sector 9), the diffusions of which are in Germany limited
to the residual sector (Sector 15), while in France they are connected to the peripheral core, mainly
innovating Sectors 12, 13, 14 and 15. As far as the extra-core diffusions are concerned, the
traditional, biunivocal, innovative couples of Japan, and the univocal, motorveichles based,
innovative couples of France and, especially, of Germany are still the most representative.
(iii) In the early 90s (Figure 3.6), the first cluster confirms the dichotomy between Australia
and the remaining technological systems. Here, in turn, Canada is clearly distinct from the United
Kingdom and Denmark at least in two respects. On the one hand, their chemical sector (Sector 5)
gets closer to the role it has in the big-countries cluster (it innovates the most immaterial technology
based sectors (Sectors 13, 14, 15, and, in the United Kingdom, also Sectors 11 and 12). On the
other hand, a similar argument holds for machineries (Sector 11), which also reach some traditional
and resource intensive sectors (Sectors 4, 8, 9, and, in the United Kingdom, also Sectors 2, 6, and
7). The combined effect of this two patterns implies a clear reduction in the dicothomy between the
terminal sectors that are innovated, quite evident in the previous periods, especially in the early 80s.
In this period, therefore, Denmark and the United Kingdom seem to converge towards the structure
of the second cluster.
Here also important changes are observable. The most relevant is, as we already said, that ofGermany, which degenerates in an enlarged supercore of mostly pervasive and interlocked sectors,
made up of chemicals (Sector 5), metal products (Sector 10), machineries (Sector 11) and
motorveichles (Sector 13). Also France enlarges the standard ‘5-10-11-Sector core’, with the
addition of rubber and plastic (Sector 7). The peripheral core of the resource intensive sectors
generally reduces its outdegree centrality. Japan maintains its idiosyncratic structure, and also the
sectoral specification of both the supercore and the peripheral core (except for the diminishing
pervasive role of rubber and plastic). Small changes only occur in the extra-core diffusions: paper
and printing (Sector 4) increases its innovative weight, diffusing, in addition to all the other
traditional sectors, also Sectors 8, 10 and 15. Moreover, relevant diffusions also emerges in the
lower part of the classification, particularly that from professional goods (Sector 14) to shipbuilding
(Sector 12).
Conclusions
In this paper we have carried out an empirical analysis of the innovative flows which constitute
the skeleton of the technological systems of eight OECD countries in the last decade. Given the
systemic nature of the innovative process, we have opted for an analytical instrument, network
analysis, which reveals particularly appropriate for the investigation of complex techno–economic
interrelationships.
The density analysis, performed to measure the connectivity of the technological systems,
shows that separate clusters emerge according to structural kinds of elements, such as size,
technological intensity, model of capitalism, and institutional arrangements. Furthermore, the eight
countries investigated show a process of ‘conditional convergence’, hinting that the globalisation
phase they entered in the last decade might have also attenuated differences of structural nature,
but only in relative terms.
The centrality analysis mainly confirms other standard sectoral taxonomies. However, the
exclusive reference to embodied innovative flows ends up with emphasizing the role of specialised
suppliers sectors and of sectors whose technology is basically material.
The centrality distributions and the centralisation analyses also point to quite separated
groupings, although not completely homogeneous and stable. A first cluster, with a quite
‘hierarchic’ structure, is made up of Australia, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. A second one, whose structure is relatively more ‘parithetic’ comprehends France,
Germany, and Japan.
The analysis of the oriented graphs, mapping the sectoral destinations of the innovative flows,
further enhances the differences among and inside the previously defined clusters. In all the
technological systems of the former the chemical sector innovates only some of the traditional and
resource intensive sectors, while the diffusions towards the immaterial technology sectors are
instead relatively less frequent. Within the second cluster, the chemical sector becomes generally as
pervasive as the metal products one, with a maximum outward centrality. The same holds for
machineries. Unlike the former group, the resource intensive sectors gain remarkable importance,
and significant innovative couples, sometimes even biunivocal, can be identified in the more
traditional sectors (Japan) and in the motorveichles (Germany).
Although these structural characteristics are more or less persistent along the three periods, two
major structural changes can however be identified. The more evident is that of Germany, which by
the early 90s radically changes the distribution of its pervasive core, which narrows to four
(chemicals, metal products, machineries, and motorveichles), with maximum (or nearly maximum)
outward centrality. The remaining sectors turn into totally dependent, and this seems to point out to
an intensive, rather than an extensive, structural change, addressed to focus on and exploit the
externalities of the main sectoral specialisations. The second substantial change is that of Denmark
(and to a lesser extent of the United Kingdom) which in the second, and especially in the third
period, gets closer to the structure of the ‘Rhenish–Japanese’ cluster. This change is mainly due to
the pervasive role acquired by the machinery sector, with which the other sectors get more
vertically integrated.
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AppendixA1. Sample characteristics
Input-output tables R&D expenditure
Australia 1986, 1989 1986, 1989
Canada 1981, 1986, 1990 1981, 1986, 1990
Denmark 1980, 1985, 1990 1980, 1985, 1990
France 1980, 1985, 1990 1980, 1985, 1990
Germany 1978, 1986, 1990 1978, 1986, 1990
Japan 1980, 1985, 1990 1980, 1985, 1990
United Kingdom 1979, 1984, 1990 1979, 1984, 1990
The Netherlands 1981, 1986 1981, 1986
Source: OECD, DSTI (STAN, OECD, DSTI (STAN,
I-O), 1995 ANBERD), 1994
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Appendix A2. Sectoral disaggregation
1 Food, beverages and tobacco
2 Textile, apparel and leather
3 Wood products and furniture
4 Paper, paper products, printing and publishing
5 Chemical industry, drugs and medicines
6 Energy products
7 Rubber and plastics products
8 Non-metallic mineral products
9 Ferrous and non-ferrous metals
10 Metal products
11 Non-electrical machinery and electronics
12 Shipbuilding and repairing
13 Motor vehicles and other means of transport
14 Professional goods
15 Other manufacturing